Corporate Governance and Financial Distress in the Banking Industry: Nigerian Experience by John, Ayoola Tajudeen & Ogechukwu, Obokoh Lawrence
Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies (ISSN: 2220-6140) 
Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 182-193, February 2018  
182 
 
Corporate Governance and Financial Distress in the Banking Industry: Nigerian Experience 
 
Ayoola Tajudeen John1, 2Obokoh Lawrence Ogechukwu 
1Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria 
2Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa 
alabiayoolaaca@yahoo.com, lechukwu2001@yahoo.com 
 
Abstract: The study investigates the effect of corporate governance on financial distress in the Nigerian 
banking industry and examines the discriminatory power of corporate governance mechanism of the board, 
audit committee, executive management and auditor in one model for financial distress prediction. Secondary 
data obtained from annual financial statements of twenty banks between 2005 and 2015 were used for the 
study. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and generalized quantile regression model. The 
empirical evidence from the study suggests that financially distressed banks are characterized by large board 
size with members who may not be well versed in banking complexities, chairmen and CEOs with significant 
shareholding both individually and collectively. Furthermore, the evidence also shows that distressed banks 
suffer major decline in customer deposits despite increase in size. The study concludes that financial distress 
can be caused by poor corporate governance mechanism. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Banks play a very important role in the society, occupying critical position in the process of promoting 
economic growth (Wanke, Barros and Faria, 2015). As a result of this role, a properly functioning banking 
sector is crucial for the growth of an economy and the stability of the financial system (Hoggarth, Reis and 
Saporta, 2002). National governments through their regulatory agencies have shown concern towards the 
proper functioning of the banking industry and have therefore regulated the industry. However, despite the 
supervision and regulatory role of government, the industry has been periodically characterized by financial 
distress thereby resulting in huge loss of shareholders’ funds and erosion of public confidence in the system 
(Lang and Schmidt, 2016). Financial distress in banking remains a significant issue for owners, managers and 
the public (Simpson and Gleason, 1999) and early warning signals have been advocated as essential to limit 
the potential adverse effect of financial distress on the economy (Li, Crooks, and Andreeva, 2014). Various 
models have been used in financial distress prediction starting with diverse statistical methods such as 
Altman’s (1968) multiple discriminant analysis, Ohlson’s (1980) logistic regression; Intelligent models such 
as neural network model, support vector machine, genetic algorithm, genetic programming and others. All of 
these methods focused on the explanatory powers of financial, accounting and market variables 
(Manzaneque, Priego and Merino, 2016).  
 
However, in the early 1990s, another strand of research that explores corporate governance variables and 
their roles in predicting financial distress emerged in literature (Chan, Chou, Lin, and Liu, 2016). These 
authors have argued that economic and financial data alone do not provide sufficient predictive power of 
future distress, hence, the need to consider variables representative of corporate governance characteristics 
(Heremans, 2007; Chen, 2008; Chang, 2009). Amendola, Restaino and Sensini (2015) specifically argued that 
the structure of the firm's board of directors and ownership and the interaction among them can affect the 
probability of failure. While Zeitun (2009) states that the agency problem between the shareholders of a 
company and the management leads to inefficiency in terms of ownership concentration. The 2007-2009 
global financial crises triggered a more robust discussion of corporate governance and brought it to the front 
burner of international dimension (Villanueva-Villar, Rivo-Lopez and Lago-Penas, 2016). According to Iqbal, 
Strobl and Vahamaa (2015) believe that politicians, banking supervisors and other authorities attributed 
financial crises to the flaws in the corporate governance practices of financial institutions (Kirkpatrick, 2009; 
Haldane, 2012). 
 
Corporate governance is a mechanism that is used to protect the rights of different stakeholders. It specifies 
the distribution of such rights and responsibilities among the different actors in the corporation such as the 
shareholders, board, managers, and others. It spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions in 
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corporate affairs (OECD, 1999). Corporate governance participants are the board of directors (BODs), audit 
committee, shareholders, top management and the auditors (Rezaee, 2007). No corporate governance would 
be necessary if management acted in the best interest of shareholders and if the board members effectively 
discharge their fiduciary duties and professional responsibilities. Corporate governance is needed to avoid 
concentration of power in the hands of management and to create an effective system of checks and balances 
to appropriately balance power-sharing authority among shareholders, board, management, and, to a lesser 
extent, other stakeholders. It is a monitoring mechanism for assessing corporate responsibility and 
accountability through the board, audit committee, management and auditors in order to serve and protect 
the interest of investors (Rezaee and Riley, 2010). There is substantial evidence that one corporate 
governance size does not always fit all firms in all countries as governance structure differs from one country 
to another (Black, de Carvalho and Gorga, 2012). Though there is a body of literature that highlights the 
importance of corporate governance and its influence on the likelihood of financial distress, the contribution 
has been limited because of the legal processes and definitions of financial distress which vary from one 
country to another (Manzaneque et al., 2016).   
 
This study is justified because it extends the analysis of financial distress to other geographical contexts. 
Additionally, a more comprehensive determination of financial distress situation will contribute to the 
existing literature (Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster, 2015). Furthermore, the focus of most studies on 
corporate governance and financial distress centers on board structure and/or ownership characteristics 
with the exclusion of other participants such as the shareholders, audit committee and the auditor in the 
same model (Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). To this end, the study raises the question as to how can we test 
the discriminatory powers of corporate governance mechanism of the board, external auditors, shareholders, 
and ownership structure in one model that can predict financial distress in the Nigerian banking industry? In 
view of this, the study investigates the effect of corporate governance on financial distress and examines the 
discriminatory power of corporate governance mechanism of the board, audit committee, executive 
management and auditor in one model for financial distress prediction in the Nigerian banking industry. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the review of relevant literature. Section 3 
describes the data and methodological approach while Section 4 discusses the results. The conclusion and 
policy recommendation are provided in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Financial distress is a broad concept used to describe situations in which firms face financial difficulty. The 
most common terms used interchangeably for financial distress are ‘failure’, ‘default’, ‘insolvency’, and 
‘bankruptcy’ (Geng, Bose, and Chen, 2015). However, bankruptcy is the extreme and irredeemable outcome of 
financial distress and as such many financially distressed firms escape bankruptcy due to early 
reconstruction of operations. There are many definitions of financial distress because different countries 
have different accounting procedures and rules. It is generally believed that it is a situation where operating 
cash flow does not exceed negative net assets (Li et al., 2014). Geng et al. (2015) state that some of the 
methods that have been used for financial distress prediction include discriminant analysis, logit or probit 
regression model, linear conditional probability models, neural network, decision trees, case based reasoning, 
genetic algorithm, rough sets, support vector machine, and others. However, the assumptions underlying the 
majority of these methods are far from real world situation. Extant research has focused on the discovery of 
better models for financial distress prediction because of the limitations of statistical techniques that have 
been extensively used over the years. 
 
Financial Distress in the Nigerian Banking Industry: In Nigeria, financial distress has been a pervasive 
issue as the banking sector has been periodically characterized by financial distress. The history of Nigerian 
banking distress can be conveniently divided into three eras namely: the era between (i) 1940s and 1950s; 
(ii) 1989 and 1998; and (iii) 2007 and 2010. The distress experienced between 1940s and 1950s was 
attributable to mismanagement of assets, lack of adequate capital and managerial expertise due to untrained 
personnel to mention but a few (Adekanye, 1983; Osaze and Anao, 1990). The second era of financial crisis 
was first observed in 1989 when there was mass withdrawal of deposits by government agencies, this 
situation worsened in 1993 after the annulled June 12 presidential election. This led to the collapse of the 
inter-bank market which later spread to all segments of the financial system (Ailemen, 2003; Hecko, 2007; 
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Sanusi, 2010). The third era of financial distress crisis happened in the aftermath of the 2007- 2009 global 
financial crises that prompted the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to provide funding support to the banking 
industry. The third era of distress was partly explained by the global financial crisis, but, it was evident that 
the banks contributed in no small measure to its escalation. During this period, the CBN ordered a special 
investigation into the financial condition of the country’s 24 banks. At the end of the investigation, the boards 
of eight banks were dismissed on the grounds of insider abuses, fraud, poor risk management, inadequate 
capital and corporate governance issues (Osaze, 2011; Sanusi, 2011). Consequently, the CBN injected fresh 
Tier II capital amounting to US $4.1 billion into the banking industry (Sanusi, 2010; Fadare, 2011). Financial 
distress is not a new phenomenon in the Nigerian banking sector. Despite this, only a few studies have been 
carried out on this issue, almost all of which utilized logit/probit models and focused on bankruptcy, which is 
the final outcome of financial distress. 
 
Concept of Corporate Governance and the Nigerian Banking Industry: Various definitions reflecting 
different perspectives of corporate governance exist in the literature because of its multidimensional nature. 
Cadbury (1992) defines corporate governance as the mechanisms that are used to protect the interests of 
different stakeholders. Though studies have attempted to develop corporate governance indices that 
aggregate a number of mechanisms to investigate how corporate governance relates to performance, the 
literature indicates that there is no single, standard corporate governance index that can be considered as 
“one size fits all” (Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Rygh, 2016). The various views on corporate governance relates 
to different cultural contexts and intellectual background (Idam, 2015). In Nigeria, corporate governance 
studies have grown rapidly in recent times following the dismissal of the chief executives of eight banks by 
the Central Bank of Nigeria on the grounds of corporate governance issues among other factors. The CBN 
alleged that the 2007-2010 banking crisis in Nigeria was caused partly by poor corporate governance by 
banks’ management. This revelation generated a lot of interest in corporate governance studies. However, the 
studies on corporate governance have been largely related to performance with little or no studies on the 
effect of corporate governance on financial distress. Thus, the role of corporate governance in financial 
distress has been largely neglected. According to Manzaneque et al. (2016), previous empirical debate on 
financial distress focuses on explanatory powers of financial and accounting information applying diverse 
statistical methods such as linear discriminant analysis and logit/probit analysis. Several researchers have 
argued that economic and financial data alone do not provide sufficient predictive power of distress and is 
therefore necessary to include variables representative of corporate governance characteristics to improve 
the predictive power of the model (Chen, 2008; Chang, 2009; Lakshan and Wijekoon, 2012). 
 
Review of Theories applicable to the Study: The theoretical framework underlying this study includes 
theories such as the agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, and the theoretical 
institutional perspective (Xu, 2007). The agency theory is the most prominent and rooted in the idea of 
separation of business ownership and control between shareholders and managers. The agency problem 
arises out of the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of the agents against the welfare of their 
principals (Duhnfort, Klein, and Lampenius, 2008; Idam, 2015). However, agency theory is limited because it 
does not explain the multidimensional complexity and character of corporate governance phenomenon 
(Adegbite, 2015; Briano-Turrent and Rodriguez-Ariza, 2016). The stewardship theory sees managers as good 
stewards of the business organization who work diligently to attain high level of corporate profit and 
shareholders’ returns. The stakeholder theory on the other hand sees the organization as a system of 
stakeholders operating under a wider societal system, which provides the input, market, legal and other 
operational infrastructure for the organization. The theory advocates that stakeholders, including employees, 
customers, suppliers, communities and other groups, are directly or indirectly affected by the organization’s 
operations, and should have a representation on the board of directors. The resource-dependency theory 
categorizes corporate governance mechanisms as firm’s resources and suggests that the resources possessed 
by a firm are the primary determinants of its performance (Wernerfelt, 1984; Bernadette and Corina, 2015). 
Empirical studies such as Letza, Sun, and Kirkbride (2004) and Garcia-Torea, Fenandez-Feijoo and de la 
Cuesta (2016) have established that the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives are the most relevant 
approaches for analyzing the firm’s corporate governance. While the former considers that the key aim of 
corporate governance is the protection of shareholder interests, the latter advocates that the main objective 
of corporate governance is to guarantee the interests of all of the firm’s stakeholders. Following the works of 
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Money and Schepers (2007), this study extends the scope of corporate governance by considering 




Data and Sample: The population of the study comprised deposit money banks operating in Nigeria between 
2005 and 2015, of which the number varied from 25 in 2005 and 22 in 2015. The sample consisted of an 
unbalanced panel data set obtained from the audited annual financial statements of 20 banks for which 
information was available during the period under consideration.  
 
Model Specification and Measurement of Variables: To test for the effect of corporate governance on 
financial distress in the Nigerian banking industry, we adopted the following model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋3 𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … + 𝛽21𝑋21 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
Dependent Variable: The dependent variable is financial distress. Different indices have been used to 
capture financial distress. Following the works of Wanke, Barros and Faria (2015), Cielen, Peeters and 
Vanhoof (2004), Premachandra, Bhabra and Sueyoshi (2009), Premachandra, Chen and Watson (2011), Shiri 
and Salehi (2012), and Li et al. (2014), this study adopted efficiency scores determined through data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) as proxies of financial distress. The major underlying hypothesis is that lower 
efficiency levels imply greater chance for an eventual financial distress situation in the future and efficiency 
measures can successfully distinguish between healthy and distressed banks (Wanke et al., 2015). According 
to Li et al. (2014), it is logical to assume that efficiency is associated with the probability of financial distress. 
Empirical studies have established that there is significant difference of scores between healthy and failing 
banks and the difference increases as the date of failure approaches (Barr, Seiford and Siems, 1993; Geng, 
Bose and Chen, 2015). The efficiency scores lie between ‘1’ and ‘0’. The value ‘0’ indicates that the evaluated 
bank is on the financial distress frontier and the value ‘1’ indicates that the evaluated bank is healthy. 
Intensity of financial distress decreases as the score moves from ‘0’ to ‘1’ (Shetty, Pakkala and 
Mallikarjunappa, 2012). To define input and output variables, we follow the intermediation approach of 
Sealey and Lindley (1977) which justifies the approach on the ground that the primary function of banks is to 
channel financial funds from savers to investors. In line with previous studies, we define three input and 
three output variables. We follow the original idea of DEA that inputs and outputs are measured as 
absolute amounts rather than as ratios (Li et al., 2014). Thus, the input variables are gross revenue, profit 
before interest and tax, and deposit, while the output variables are non-performing loans, total liabilities and 
staff cost. 
 
Independent Variables: The independent variables and their a priori expectations based on literature are as 
shown in Table 1. This includes 21 indices of corporate governance variables and control variables over four 
governance mechanisms of the board, shareholder, external audit and ownership structure.   
 
Control Variables: Following prior studies such as Shehzad, de Haan and Scholtens (2010), Munisi and 
Randoy (2013), and Rygh (2016), we include the following control variables: (i) size measured as logarithm 
of total assets: larger banks may have better performance because of economies of scale; (ii) capital measured 
as equity to assets: banks with high capital may have more resources that may allow them to adopt good 
practices; (iii) leverage measured as liabilities to assets: debt may affect company performance as it reduces 
the free cash flow, moreover, highly leveraged banks are more closely monitored by debt providers, who may 
put pressure on management to adopt good governance practices; (iv) business model measured as net loans 
to total assets; (v) managers’ efficiency measured as cost to income ratio; (vi) profitability measured as profit 
before interest and tax: profitability has a significant impact on market valuation as investors accept a 
premium for owning more profitable companies; and (vii) growth measured by growth in deposit as deposit 
may influence a bank’s financial market performance and corporate governance practices.   
 
Estimation Techniques: Two-stage estimation process was adopted for the investigation of the effect of 
corporate governance on financial distress in the Nigerian banking industry. The first stage involved 
determining distress scores using DEA efficiency frontier, while the second stage involved determining the 
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effect of corporate governance on financial distress using a variety of techniques in line with previous studies 
(Simar and Wilson, 2011; Johnson and Kuosmanen, 2012). A large number of studies have used a variety of 
techniques including the standard linear regression model, fixed and random effects regression models, 
censored normal regression model (that is, Tobit model), Simar and Wilson (2007) model, among others. The 
standard linear model including fixed and random effects regression models have been considered 
inappropriate for the second-stage DEA because they allow predicted values to lie outside the admissible 
interval (0, 1) determined by the measurement scale (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008; Pericoli, Pierucci and 
Ventura, 2013). The two-limit Tobit regression has also been considered as a conceptually flawed model for 
proportional data. This is because DEA scores are not observationally censored by Tobit model but are 
defined only over the interval (Simar and Wilson, 2007; Cook, Kieschnick and McCullough, 2008; McDonald, 
2009). 
 
A model that has been proposed as an effective alternative to the two flawed techniques is quantile 
regression model (Rousseliere, 2014; Shawtari, Salem, Hussain, Alaeddin and Thabit, 2016). As the dependent 
variable takes the ranges between upper and lower values (0, 1), it results in having a number of percentiles 
of dependent variable, in which its relationship with corporate governance varies from one percentile to 
another. Therefore, estimating the relationship based on the averaged figures or means may not reflect the 
reality and would hide some information due to heterogeneity of the data (Chi, Huang, and Xie, 2015). 
Consequently, it is believed that using the quantile regression would provide a better estimation for the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables as the analysis estimate the relationship at any 
point conditional on the distribution of the dependent variable (Shawtari et al., 2016). 
 
Quantile regression relaxes one of the fundamental conditions of ordinary least square (OLS) and permits the 
estimation of various quantile functions, helping to examine in particular the tail behaviors of that 
distribution (Parente and Santos-Silva, 2016). It departs from conditional-mean models as it allows for 
heterogeneity and deal with endogeneity problem associated with governance studies (Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki and Mamatzakis, 2011; Liu and Miu, 2010). It is invariant to monotonic transformations and robust 
to outliers (Baum, 2013). Also, it is asymptotically consistent and valid under intra-cluster correlation; and 
robust even when the error term is heteroskedastic and non-normally distributed (Aldieri and Vinci, 2017; 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis, 2011; Powell, 2014; Powell, 2016). A version of quantile regression 
model known as the generalized quantile regression model was applied to estimate the effect of financial 
distress in the second stage analysis. The generalized quantile estimator addresses a fundamental problem 
posed by traditional quantile estimators, namely: inclusion of additional covariates alters the interpretation 
of the estimated coefficient on the treatment variable (Powell, 2014). The generalized quantile estimator 
implemented by “genqreg in STATA application” addresses this problem and produces unconditional quantile 




Descriptive Statistics: Table 2 depicts descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, independent 
variables and control variables used in the empirical analysis. For the dependent variable, we found that the 
sample firms have a mean financial distress level of approximately 50%. The average board is composed of 
about eleven members and the proportion of independent directors is around 53% of the total board 
members. The board meets for an average of 7 times per year. Regarding shareholding, the chairman and the 
chief executive officer hold about 2% each of shares, the largest shareholder controls about 4%, while insider 
management comprising of all directors and the chief executive officer hold about 11% which indicate a fair 
alignment of interests between ownership and the board. The institutional shareholders hold about 20% in 
shareholding. 
 
Financial Distress Scores (First Stage): The study adopted a two-stage approach in the analysis of the effect 
of corporate governance on financial distress in Nigerian banks. In the first stage, DEA efficiency estimator 
was used to obtain distress scores proxied by efficiency scores for individual banks as the dependent variable. 
An input-oriented, variable return to scale (VRS) approach which is based on the assumption that banks have 
more control over their inputs than outputs was adopted. Financial distress was modeled with technical 
efficiency scores where efficiency scores of “1” means healthy banks while efficiency scores between “0” and 
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“0.9” suggest different levels of inefficiencies. Following the works of Kumar and Gulati (2008), we utilized 
the quartile values of efficiency scores as cut-off points to segregate the banks into three categories as 
follows: 
  Quartile values between 0.1 – 0.5 = distressed banks 
  Quartile values between 0.6 – 0.9 = marginally healthy banks 
  Quartile values of 1                       = healthy banks 
 
Generalized Quantile Regression Analysis Results (Second Stage): Table 3 shows the second stage 
analyses of the effect of corporate governance variables on financial distress in Nigerian banking industry. 
The results of the generalized quantile regression model (using quartile values between 0.1 and 0.5 for 
distressed banks) show that nine variables are statistically significant at 5% level. Board size (lnbsize) 
presents a positive coefficient on financial distress. The variable shows a statistically significant relationship 
with financial distress at a 5% significance level. This suggests that distressed banks are characterized with a 
large board that may be ignorant of the dynamics of the banking industry. Small boards are more likely to 
monitor management better since their members are less able to hide in a large group. They are also more 
likely to be involved in strategy formation and abler to arrive at decisions faster than larger ones. This finding 
is consistent with the work of Briano-Turrent & Rodriguez-Ariza (2016) which associate large boards with 
distress. This study is at variance with the resource dependence theory which argues that large boards offer 
better advantages than small boards (Manzaneque et al., 2016). 
 
Board independence (bind) presents a positive coefficient and statistically significant effect on financial 
distress at a 5% significance level. This indicates that distressed banks have more non-executive directors on 
their boards who may not contribute positively to the progress of the banks. Independent directors may lack 
in-depth knowledge of the internal workings of the banks on whose boards they sit. They may also lack the 
financial expertise to understand the complexity of the securitization processes banks engage in and the risks 
involved. This finding is in alignment with the works of Adams (2010, 2012) which concludes that board 
independence may not necessarily be beneficial for banks, as independent directors may not always have the 
expertise necessary to oversee banking firms. This study is at variance with the agency theory which posits 
that the proportion of independent directors is negatively related to financial distress (Manzaneque et al. , 
2016). Ownership diffusion (lnshares) presents a negative coefficient and statistically significant effect on 
financial distress at 5 %. This implies that distressed banks have less diffused ownership or fewer numbers of 
shares. The chairman (chair) share ownership presents a positive coefficient and statistically significant effect 
on financial distress at 5% significance level, implying that in distressed banks, chairmen hold a significant 
number of controlling shares.  
 
Chief Executive Officers (CEO) share ownership also present a positive coefficient and statistically significant 
effect on financial distress at 5% significance level, with the implication that in distressed banks, chief 
executive officers also hold significant number of controlling shares. Insider ownership (insider) representing 
the shares owned by all the directors including the CEO presents a negative coefficient and a statistically 
significant indirect effect on financial distress. Insider shareholders are considered to have access to a greater 
extent and better quality of bank-specific information. The implication of a negative effect could be that 
insider shareholders have access to inside information of the poor financial state of the banks and the quick 
divestment of shares by the directors. Size (bind) proxied by log of assets presents a positive coefficient and 
statistically significant direct effect on financial distress at 5%. This suggests that as size increases, the banks 
might face more risk events. This finding is in alignment with the works of Wang and Hsu (2013) which 
document that larger banks are associated with higher systemic risk. Growth (growth) proxied by customer 
deposits presents a negative coefficient and statistically significant indirect effect on financial distress at a 5% 
significance level, implying that the propensity to withdraw deposits increases with the magnitude of 
financial distress. This finding is in line with the works of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and Egan, Hortacsu, 
and Matvos (2015) who affirm that distressed banks experience large decline in customer deposits. 
 
In Nigeria, banks are supervised by regulatory organs such as the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and governed by their board of directors. Various initiatives have been carried out 
by the regulatory authorities to improve corporate governance in Nigeria including but not limited to the 
creation of codes of corporate governance. Some of the provisions of the code include a pegging of direct and 
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indirect equity holding in any bank to 10% and an equity holding of above 10% by any investor subject to the 
regulatory prior approval; a maximum board size of 20 directors; an appointment of a chief compliance 
officer, among other rules (Uche, 2014). Some studies on corporate governance in Nigeria focused on the 
structure and the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different corporate governance 
participants (Garuba and Otomewo, 2015; Adeyemi and Olowu, 2013; Uche, 2014). Few studies constructed a 
corporate governance index and evaluated its effect on banks’ performance (Ajala, Amuda and Arulogun, 
2012). The outcome of studies on corporate governance in Nigerian banks revealed that corporate 
governance impacted on performance (Thomas and Mohammed, 2011; Sanda, Mikailu and Garba, 2005; 
Kajola, 2008; James and Okafor, 2011; Ahmad and Mansur, 2012; Akingunola, Adekunle, and Adedipe, 2013). 
 
Table 1: Measurement and a priori Expectation of Independent Variables 
S/NO VARIABLES MEASUREMENT A PRIORI 
 BOARD STRUCTURE   
1 Board Size (lnbs) Log of Total Directors ± 
2 Board Independence (bind) Non-Executive Directors/ Total Directors ± 
3 Board Salaries (bsal) Board Compensation/ Total Compensation ± 
4 Board Meetings (lnbmtg) Log of Total Number of Meetings ± 
5 Female Directorship (bfemale) Number of Female Directors/ Total 
Directors 
± 
6 Foreign Directorship (bforeign) Foreign Directors/ Total Directors ± 
 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE   
7 Chairman’s share ownership 
(chair) 
Chairman’s Shares/ Total Number of Shares        ± 
8 CEO’s share ownership (ceo) CEO’s Shares/ Total Number of Shares       ± 
9 Chairman & CEO’ share ownership 
combined (chairceo) 
Chairman’s and CEO’s Shares combined/ 
Total Number of Shares 
      ± 
10 Insider Ownership (insider) Insider’s Shares/ Total Number of Shares      ±   
11 Institutional Ownership (inst) Institutional Ownership Shares/ Total 
Number of Shares 
     ±   
12 Largest Shareholders (largest) Largest shareholder/Total Shares      ±  
 SHAREHOLDERS   
13 Total number of shares (lnshares) Log of total number of shares      -- 
14 Equity (lnequity) Log of equity      -- 
 EXTERNAL AUDITING   
15 Auditor’s Opinion (opinion) 1= Qualified Audit Opinion      -- 
  0= Favorable Audit Opinion  
 CONTROL VARIABLES   
16 Size (size) Log of Total Assets       ± 
17 Capital (capital) Equity/ Total Assets       -- 
18 Leverage (leverage) Liabilities/Total Assets        + 
19 Management Efficiency (efficiency) Operating Cost/ Operating Income      -- 
20 Profitability (profit) Profit before Interest and Tax      -- 
21 Growth(growth) Log of Deposit      -- 
Source: Shawtari, Salem, Hussain, Alaeddin, and Thabit (2016); Li, Crooks and Andreeva      (2014); 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
distress 0.509 0.537 0.341 0.100 1.000 
lnbsize 1.144 1.146 0.096 0.845 1.322 
bind 0.529 0.533 0.085 0.200 0.750 
bsal 0.247 0.016 0.037 0.001 0.382 
lnbmtg 0.755 0.699 1.165 0.602 1.380 
bfemale 0.095 0.071 0.088 0.000 0.429 
bforeign 0.043 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.316 
lnshares 4.134 4.142 0.249 3.486 4.639 
lnequity 4.915 5.030 0.521 3.107 6.023 
chair 0.012 0.001 0.024 0.000 0.146 
ceo 0.014 0.003 0.022 0.000 0.095 
chairceo 0.027 0.009 0.035 0.001 0.148 
insider 0.112 0.064 0.140 0.001 0.907 
inst 0.201 0.119 0.254 0.000 1.000 
largest 0.044 0.030 0.048 0.000 0.249 
opinion 0.127 0.000 0.334 0.000 1.000 
lnsize 5.639 5.707 0.441 4.289 6.443 
capital 0.130 0.151 0.215 -1.042 0.668 
leverage 0.883 0.849 0.195 0.410 2.042 
efficiency 0.828 0.660 0.814 0.276 9.483 
profit  3.601 3.973 1.191 0.000 5.043 
growth 5.565 5.607 0.459 4.093 6.410 
Source: Authors’ computation, 2017 
 
Table 3: Generalized Quantile Regression Model Results 
Variables Coefficient Z- Statistics Prob- Significance 
Dependent Variable:    
 distress    
Independent Variables    
lnbsize 0.9655619 2.00 0.045** 
bind 1.100266 2.27 0.023* * 
bsal -1.58429 -1.09 0.275 
lnbmtg 0.0442366 0.17 0.867 
bfemale -0.3131937 -0.88 0.377 
bforeign -0.4237746 -1.23 0.219 
lnshares -0.4727464 -2.89 0.004** * 
lnequity 0.2549368 1.04 0.297 
chair 4458.867 3.14 0.002*** 
ceo 4452.235 3.14 0.002*** 
chairceo -4453.376 -3.14 0.002*** 
insider -1.485981 -2.42 0.016** 
inst 0.0682644 0.47 0.639 
largest 1.61275 0.98 0.329 
opinion 0.0391501 0.24 0.811 
lnsize 1.3501 3.21 0.001*** 
capital -0.4301007 -1.24 0.214 
leverage -0.7988084 -1.17 0.240 
efficiency -0.2150012 -0.89 0.373 
profit 0.0008392 0.03 0.978 
growth -1.012666 -2.37 0.018** 
_cons -1.468274 -1.85 0.065 
Source: Authors’ computation, 2017. 
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This table shows the generalized quantile regression model analysis of the effect of corporate governance on 
financial distress in Nigeria. The first column shows the variables; the second column shows the model 
coefficient. The third column displays the z-statistic while the fourth column indicates the significance at 1, 5 
and 10 denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
This study examined the effect of corporate governance on financial distress in the Nigerian banking industry. 
We analyzed a sample of 20 banks over the period between 2005 and 2015 and measured financial distress 
by DEA technical efficiency following previous studies and corporate governance variables along board 
characteristics, ownership structure, shareholding, external audit opinion and control variables. Using 
generalized quantile regression model, we found that corporate governance variables which significantly 
influence financial distress are board size; independence; share ownership by chairmen, chief executive 
officers and directors; size; and deposit. The empirical results suggest that distressed banks are characterized 
by large board size and non-executive board members who may lack financial expertise and in-depth 
knowledge of the complexity of banking businesses. Share ownership by chairmen and CEOs both 
individually and jointly are significantly and positively related to financial distress suggesting that the banks 
may have been managed to fulfill some personnel interest which contradicts established opinion that the 
interest of both the chairman and CEO will align where share ownership by chairman and CEO are significant. 
Lastly, distressed banks experience massive withdrawal of customer deposits and divestment by insider 
management who also double as shareholders. Consequently, for corporate governance policy 
implementation, banks should employ smaller board size with members having the requisite banking 
knowledge, which will allow them to run efficiently. The regulatory authority should strengthen corporate 
governance mechanism that will help to reduce the incidence of financial distress and improve uniform 
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